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THE HEAVENLY REALM OF REGULATION: WHAT
IS THE OUTLOOK FOR DBS NOW?
KIMETrE GLENN
I. INTRODUCTION
S EVERAL YEARS AGO, the Federal Communications
Commission (the "FCC" or "Commission") began a
policy of deregulating the communications industry to ac-
commodate new media forms and allow potentially unlim-
ited expansion of the information market.' There were
two reasons for the deregulation. The first reason, based
on the United States' policy of free market enterprise, was
to encourage competition in the domestic market among
communication enterprises. 2 Related to encouraging do-
mestic competition is the goal of furthering the United
States' position in the international communications ex-
port market.' The second reason for deregulation was to
allow consumers to make more informed choices by in-
' Fowler, Introductory Remarks, 16 CASE W. RES. INT'L L. 167, 168 (1984) [here-
inafter cited as Fowler]. The consideration of telecommunications deregulation
began in the 1960s with the antitrust case against AT&T which questioned
whether allowing the monopoly to exist was in the best interest of the public.
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) aft'd, 103 S.Ct. 1240
(1983). See also 35 F.C.C. 2d 844 (1972), recon., 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972) (FCC
granted an open entry policy for domestic satellites); In re Deregulation of Radio,
73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979).
2 Fowler, supra note 1, at 168.
3 Federal Communications Commission, Advisory Committee Report, ITU
WARC ORB '85 at 4-3, 4-4 (Dec. 1983) [hereinafter cited as First Advisory Re-
port]. While the United States is a leader in the world market in export of com-
munciation equipment, international competition is fierce, especially from France,
Germany and Japan. Id. In addition, the French have made great strides in the
satellite launching business. Id.
221
222 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
creasing the available options.4 Deregulation resulted in
new media forms: cable television, video cassette record-
ers, interactive computer systems, home satellite receiver
dishes, and others. 5 The domestic system of FCC deregu-
lation is currently perceived as accomplishing the dual
goals of increasing competition and promoting consumer
choice.6
To maximize the technological developments in com-
munications, communications enterprises must pursue
the international market. A low-cost method of providing
instantaneous international communication became avail-
able in the 1960s with the international communications
satellite.7 The global sharing of information is consistent
with, and almost dictated by, the philosophy of the United
States toward free enterprise and free flow of informa-
tion.8 Since independent, sovereign nations compose the
international market, the United States cannot establish
international communication policy unilaterally. 9 The
4 Fowler, supra note 1, at 168. See generally, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MEDIA
POLICY SESSION, TECHNOLOGY AND LEGAL CHANGE (1979) [hereinafter cited as ME-
DIA POLICY SESSION].
MEDIA POLICY SESSION, supra note 4, at 77.
Id. at 67; Fowler, supra note 1, at 168.
Fowler, supra note 1, at 168. In 1962, Congress passed the Communications
Satellite Act in order to establish a global satellite system. The Communications
Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701, 757 (1982) [hereinafter cited as COM-
SAT]. The COMSAT agreements later evolved into the International Satellite
Organization, which has as a prime objective the commercial use of space on a
non-dicriminatory basis for international public telecommunications. Agreement
Relating to the International Telecommunication Satellite Organization, Aug. 20,
1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 (effective in the U.S. on Feb. 12, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as INTELSAT].
8 Fowler, supra note 1, at 168-69. The United States policy is to "encourage
domestic commercial exploration of space capabilities and systems for economic
benefit." United States Presidential Decision Memorandum 37, White House
Press Release, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1135, 1136 (June 20, 1978). For a
discussion of the United States Constitution First Amendment requirements relat-
ing to free flow of information, see Price, The First Amendment and Television Broad-
casting by Satellite, 23 UCLA L. REV. 879 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Price].
9 Fowler, supra note 1, at 168. COMSAT calls for the United States to establish
a commercial satellite system in conjunction with other countries, paying particular
attention to services to developing countries. 47 U.S.C. § 701 (a), (b) (1982). For
a complete list of treaties and other international agreements relating to United
States radio, see 47 U.S.C. § 603 (1984).
goals underlying the FCC's domestic deregulation policy
must be squared with the policies of other countries which
are concerned about the potentially destructive effects of
information crossing national borders and are advocating
restrictions on transborder data flows.' 0
Nowhere is the debate over the economic, socio-cul-
tural and political influence of communications in the in-
ternational arena more apparent than in discussions of
the Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS"), a dynamic com-
munications device." DBS will be placed in a geosyn-
chronous orbit 22,300 miles above the equator where it
will receive transmissions from the programmer (the
"uplink"), alter the frequency of the signal and amplify it,
then transmit the signal back to earth (the "downlink")
for direct reception by a home receiver, thus eliminating
the need for retransmissions from a terrestrial station.' 2
Because of the tremendous power of the DBS transmis-
sion, the area covered by the signal (the "footprint") is
enormous, creating transnational overspill. 3 The ability
to transmit transnational broadcasts, without filtering
through a nation's ground receiver station or cable sys-
tem, has great potential for use and misuse. 14
DBS will have the unique capability to provide televi-
sion and video services to residents of remote areas who
are not currently serviced by other broadcasting sys-
lo See generally, Christol, Prospects for an International Legal Regime for Direct Televi-
sion Broadcasting, 34 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 142 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Christol].
See infra notes 142-153 and accompanying text.
II The function of DBS is defined as "[a] radiocommunication service in which
signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct re-
ception by the general public." 47 C.F.R. § 100.3 (1984).
12 Comment, The Economic Legal and Scientific Implications of Direct Broadcast Satel-
lites, 7 CoM. & L. 3 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Implications of DBS].
1- Christol, supra note 10, at 150. A single broadcast can cover an area of one
million square miles and be received by millions of viewers. Id. The footprint of
France's proposed DBS would cover the United Kingdom, Ireland, and most of
Continental Europe. Satellite Progress and Problems Fill SCUC Agenda, BROADCAST-
ING, Sept. 3, 1984, at 39. For a discussion of overspill, see infra notes 142-154 and
accompanying text.
14 For a discussion of fears relating to potential misuse of DBS, see infra notes
142-149 and accompanying text.
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tems. t5  Further, DBS could meet the increasing con-
sumer demand for video programming by providing new
channels and diversity in programming. 16 DBS also has
the potential to provide multi-language programming, 17
high definition television ("HDTV"), 8 data transmis-
sion, 19 and educational programming, 20 as well as jobs
due to the increased size of the video market. 21
The potential benefits of DBS led to the FCC determi-
15 In re Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites
for the Period Following the 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conference, Report and Order,
90 F.C.C.2d 676, 680 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Report and Order]. According
to a 1981 Neilsen Report on television viewing, approximately 11 million people
received three or fewer television channels. Id. In Japan, DBS is the only way for
the Japanese Broadcasting Corp. to reach more than 400,000 homes in remote
areas. HDTV, DBS Standards Dominate Discussion at IBC, BROADCASTING, Oct. 1,
1984, at 41-42 [hereinafter cited as HDTV, DBS Standards].
16 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C. 2d at 681-682.
17 Id. at 682.
'8 Id. "HDTV is the name given to any video production system capable of pro-
ducing pictures with twice the horizontal and vertical resolution of the existing
television systems. (PAL, SELAM or NTSC) as well as a larger aspect ratio (width
to height)." HDTV, DBS Standards, supra note 15, at 41. The attractiveness of
HDTV is the superior quality of the picture, with little graininess, thus having a
tremendous potential impact on the viewer. Implications of DBS, supra note 12, at
14. DBS is particularly suited to HDTV technology development for four reasons:
as a new system, DBS does not need to be redesigned for HDTV, DBS has wider
frequency band required for HDTV, DBS' direct to viewer transmission avoids the
conventional television relay stations which distort the video quality, and decod-
ing an HDTV system can be solved during DBS development. Taylor, Semi-
HDTV, Transmitted Via DBS, Stands Good Chance of Being Accepted for Home Video Use,
TELEVISION/RADIo AGE, May 9, 1983, at 53-54. However critics argue that televi-
sion quality development "is a farce ... a misdirected effort brought about by the
isolation of the engineering profession from consumers." HDTV, DBS Standards,
supra note 15, at 42 (quoting Ike Blonder, head of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories).
19 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 682. Dennis Fraser, president of Ancom,
sees DBS becoming a primary source for software services for home computer
users. Satellite Progress and Problems, supra note 13, at 39. An exhibit at a satellite
user convention showed how a DBS subscriber could receive specific programs
directly from a host computer feeding the satellite. Id.
20 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 682.
2, In re Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites
for the Period Following the 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conference, Proposed Policy
Statement and Rulemaking, 86 F.C.C.2d 719, 728, 762 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Proposed Policy Statement]. One DBS applicant, Satellite Television Corp.
(STC) estimated that its DBS project would provide 14,000 - 23,000jobs nation-
wide. In re Application of Satellite Television Corp. to Construct an Experimental Direct
Broadcast Satellite, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 951, 969 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum Opinion and Order].
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nation that DBS was in the best interest of the American
public. Consequently, the FCC adopted interim DBS reg-
ulations to encourage development of the experimental
technology. 22 The FCC designed a flexible regulatory
policy with minimal constraints to create a fertile environ-
ment in which DBS could flourish. The FCC regulations
represent the ideological traditions of freedom of speech
and private control of the communications media, and
therefore take a somewhat fluid approach.24
Foreign administrations in general share the excitement
over DBS' potential capabilities. 5 Many lesser developed
countries currently without a national communications
system hope that DBS will provide them with the technol-
ogy they need at a price they can afford. 6 Most countries
desire affordable and assured access to the geostationary
orbit in which the DBS must travel 2 7 but differing ideolo-
gies result in varying methods of achieving the equitable
access. 28 As a result, the international front has not heart-
ily embraced the United States' policy of minimal regula-
tion.29 The United states, consequently, has been forced
to make adjustments in its policy to accommodate the
views and needs of other nations. °
22 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 676. See also Proposed Policy Statement,
86 F.C.C.2d 719, 721 (1981).
2- Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 721.
24 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 712-13.
25 First Advisory Report, supra note 3, at 2-11. See supra notes 15-21 and accom-
panying text.
2r First Advisory Report, supra note 3, at 2-11.
27 Id.
28 Id. "The U.S. approach to affordable services include competition, i.e. multi-
ple providers of satellite services. Thus while we stress techniques to maximize
use of the orbit and spectrum, other nations may find the trade-offs in more elabo-
rate technology and higher costs unattractive." Id. at 4-2.
29 C. CHRISTOL, Direct Television Broadcasting (DTB), in THE MODERN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw OF OUTER SPACE 605, 607-610 (1982) [hereinafter cited as C. CHRIS-
TOL, DTB]. The differing views center around two essential areas: allocation of
space resources and issues of national sovereignty. See, e.g., Christol, supra note 10
(on issues of national sovereignty); Levy, Institutional Perspectives on the Allocation of
Space Orbital Resources: The ITU, Common User Satellite Systems and Beyond, 16 CASE W.
REs.J. INT'L. L. 171 (1984) (on issues of space allocation). See infra notes 142-154
and accompanying text.
so First Advisory Report, supra note 3, at 4-28.
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Enterprises involved in DBS will have enormous
amounts of capital invested in research, hardware and
programming that will need to be protected.3 ' DBS en-
terprises, as United States entities, must comply with the
domestic regulatory framework, including the FCC rules
specifically adopted for DBS, as well as traditional areas of
business regulation such as liability, antitrust and copy-
right.32 As entities exploiting outer space resources for
private economic gain, DBS system operators and cus-
tomers must further comply with international regula-
tions. 3 Because the international regulations may be
formulated upon goals other than the promotion of free
enterprise, it is important for DBS related companies to
understand the relevant regulations and how these regu-
lations may affect business decisions.
This Comment, in Section II, identifies key issues of in-
terest to United States DBS companies and seeks to sum-
marize the development and current state of national and
international regulations relating to these issues.3 4 Sec-
tion III contains a projection of the impact of the current
regulations on the development of DBS and stresses pri-
vate enterprise concerns in making DBS an economic suc-
cess as an international communications device.35
5, The STC application projected the cost for system construction and first year
operating expenses to be about $683.6 million. Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, 91 F.C.C.2d 953, 957 (1982).
-2 See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (Antitrust); Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1982) (Antitrust); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). See
also Comment, Directing Broadcast Satellites: Protecting Rights of Contributing Artists and
Broadcasting Organizations, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 204 (1982) (discussing copyright
issues relevant to satellite transmissions) [hereinafter cited as Protecting Rights].
For a discussion of antitrust considerations, see Bennet, Media Concentration and the
FCC: Focusing with a Section Seven Lens, 66 NEv. U. L. REV. 159 (1971); BoteinJuris-
dictional and Antitrust Considerations in Regulating New Communications Technologies, 25
N.Y.L. Scn. L. REv. 863 (1980).
33 United States enterprises are affected by international law in two ways. First,
treaties to which the United States is a signatory become part of the positive law of
this country. See U.S. CoNsT. ART. VI. Second, the United States' space programs
are designed to comply with international law. See, e.g., COMSAT, supra note 7.
See also supra note 9.
-4 See infra notes 36-199 and accompanying text.
s5 See infra notes 200-234 and accompanying text.
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II. THE REALM OF REGULATION
The development of the current regulatory scheme for
DBS has evolved in a piece meal fashion over a period in
excess of twenty years.36 Four basic reasons exist for the
fragmented development. First, since the launching and
orbiting of satellites require the exploitation of outer
space, international treaties, particularly treaties relating
to outer space, must be complied with in the develop-
ment of national as well as international regulatory
frameworks. Unfortunately, the treaties do not always
directly address DBS systems and some of the unique is-
sues posed by use of DBS technology. 8 Second, since the
geosynchronous orbit in which the DBS must travel is a
potentially limited space resource, conflicts regarding the
optimum method of providing equitable access to the
orbits and frequencies have hindered development of a
cohesive regulatory scheme.3 9 Third, the unique capabil-
ity of DBS to transmit transnational broadcasts has
aroused not only excitement over its potential to provide
low-cost communications systems, but also fear that the
power will be used to transmit propaganda and violate na-
tional sovereignty. 40 Fourth, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, national and international organizations have
attempted to regulate DBS in the absence of proven tech-
nical information. 4 1 As a result, the organizations were
forced to rely on estimates as to the feasibility of the DBS
technology and the potential utilization of the geosyn-
chronous orbits. 42 The resulting regulation is a series of
compromises, on both the domestic and international
so See, C. CHRISTOL, DTB, supra note 29, at 617-703.
37 See supra note 33.
38 See infra notes 155-199 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 113-141 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 142-154 and accompanying text.
41 E. DuCharme, M. Irwin & R. Zeitoun, Direct Broadcasting by Satellite - Develop-
ment of the International Technical and Administrative Regulatory Regime, in ANNALS OF
AIR AND SPACE LAw 267, 282 (N. Matte ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
DuCharme].
42 Id. See also Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 747-49 (FCC discusses
lack of technical standards in the interim DBS regulations).
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fronts, designed to promote the development of DBS
technology while preserving national sovereignty and the
right to equitable access.43 The compromise regulations
may well have a generative effect on the as yet unproven
technology.4 4 They may also allow early DBS system op-
erators and customers to erect insurmountable entry bar-
riers to later potential DBS enterprises.45 The current
compromise regulations may instead threaten the contin-
ued development of the medium by the interim nature of
the rules and significant areas of legal protection left
unaddressed by the regulations.46
A. Regulation and Classification by the FCC
1. DBS and the Communications Act
The cornerstone of the United States' communication
law is the Communication Act of 1943,47 which establishes
the FCC as the national regulatory authority for the
broadcasting industry. The Congressional grant of power
authorizes the FCC to promulgate rules and regulations
to promote the availability of efficient world-wide radio
communication facilities to the people of the United
States. 48 The private sector controls the communications
industry itself, but private citizens cannot own the fre-
quency bands on which the signals are transmitted. 49 The
Commission grants and modifies licenses in the public in-
dustry to equitably distribute radio services.50 Tradition-
ally, the FCC has followed a policy of localism in
achieving an equitable distribution of radio and television
43 Christol, supra note 10, at 150-54.
44 For a projection by the FCC, see 86 F.C.C.2d at 721 (stating that flexibility in
regulations will best serve DBS development).
45 See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 238-241 and accompanying text.
47 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982).
48 Id. at § 151.
49 First Advisory Report, supra note 3, at 48. Section 303 of the Communica-
tions Act gives the FCC the responsibility to allocate frequency bands among vari-
ous users and to assign rights for the use of specific frequencies. 47 U.S.C. § 303
(1982).
- 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1982).
frequencies. 5' Localism refers to the assignment of
broadcast licenses on the basis of a local community ser-
vice area: the policy results in programming of a local
character.5 2
DBS, by its nature, is not "local" broadcasting. 5 In de-
ciding that it had the power to regulate DBS, the FCC
construed the 1934 Act grant of power broadly and
placed the ultimate emphasis on the distribution of ser-
vice, rather than on the mechanics of licensing, to attain
the statutory goals.54 While localism is often an effective
means of distribution, the 1934 Act does not foreclose
other means of efficiently distributing radio services. 55 In-
terpreting the 1934 Act so as to preclude regulation of
DBS by the FCC because of DBS' capacity to broadcast
over a large area would defy the obvious statutory
intent.56
Prior to assigning frequencies for the development of a
new service, the FCC must make a preliminary determina-
tion that the service is in the public's best interest.57 The
FCC concluded, on the basis of DBS' capability to provide
new consumer services over a wide area of distribution,
that DBS met the statutory requirements of a public inter-
est determination. 5  Additionally, the FCC balanced the
potential capabilities of DBS against the interests of two
groups which claimed potential harm by the entrance of
DBS into the broadcast market: current terrestrial users of
the frequencies to be allocated to DBS and current local
51 National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. F.C.C., 740 F.2d 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (court upheld FCC's authority to depart from localism in achieving statu-
tory goals); Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 737.
52 Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 685-86.
53 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 736.37. "These broad powers
have been repeatedly construed as an intent by the Congress to endow the Com-
mission with wide discretion in deciding how best to utilize all of the nation's
airwaves to attain the statute's goals." Id. Accord Nat'. Ass'n. of Broadcasters, 740
F.2d at 1198 (court confirmed FCC's authority to adopt a flexible approach).
55 Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 737.
56 Id.
57 47 C.F.R. § 100.15(c) (1985).
58 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 680-83.
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broadcasters. 59
The Commission allocated a specific portion of a fre-
quency band to interim DBS systems, requiring the cur-
rent terrestrial operators to make adjustments for non-
interference or to relocate to another band within five
years. 60 The expense of relocating to another frequency
band is great and rests on the shoulders of the terrestrial
users."' The Commission expressed its belief that the
strong incentive of eliminating signal interference would
result in DBS operators compensating current users for
the costs of relocation.62 The FCC also proposed that
equipment replacement and depreciation might partially
offset the relocation costs. 63
In establishing DBS regulations, the FCC also consid-
ered the interests of local broadcasters. A significant con-
cern in the consideration of any new technology is its
impact on existing industry forms.6 4 A new technology,
however, cannot be repudiated simply because it com-
petes with existing technologies and organizations.6 5 The
Commission must consider the economic effect of a new
service only if strong evidence exists that consumer injury
See generally, Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 686-706.
o Id. at 692-94. The Commission allocated the 12.2-12.7 GHz band to interim
DBS systems. Id.
61 Id. The cost of moving to another fequency could range from $1,000 -
$88,000. Id. at 727.
62 Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 734. Compensating a current
user for the costs of moving to another band is only one alternative proposed by
the FCC. Two other alternatives include developing equipment to overcome sig-
nal interference and delaying DBS operations until the terrestrial user relocates.
Id. at 733-34.
63 Id. at 733. This argument has been criticized on the ground that replacement
or depreciation will not come close to the relocation cost. Note, Up in the Air: An
analysis of the FCC's DBS Policy, 11 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 127, 138 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Up in the Air].
6 Comment, Who's the Captain Kirk of this Enterprise?: Regulating Outer Space Indus-
try Through Corporate Structures, 18 U.C.D. L. REV. 795, 821 (1983)[hereinafter cited
as Who's the Captain Kirk?]. In selecting the appropriate corporate structure to
regulate a space industry, the government may need to consider the possibility of
financially assisting domestic businesses to compete in international markets and
the possibility of rendering current earth based entities obsolete. See id.
6- Report and Order, 90 F.C.C. 2d at 689.
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will result. 66 Relying primarily on three market research
studies of the projected market penetration of DBS, 67 the
Commission concluded that DBS would have a negligible
impact on local broadcasting.68 The consumer benefits of
DBS, particularly the service of remote areas, far out-
weighed the "speculative" claims of injury by current ter-
restrial users and local broadcasters. 69
2. The Interim Regulations
The FCC adopted interim DBS rules in June 1982.70
The interim regulations take a minimalist approach of
66 Id.
Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against
competition but to protect the public. Congress intended to leave
competition in the business of broadcasting where it found it, to per-
mit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with other broad-
casters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his
programs attractive to the public.
Id. (quoting FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)).
67 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C. 2d at 689-92. The three studies relied on by
the FCC are as follows: Ayvasion, Blake & Cantor, Direct Broadcast Satellites:
Preliminary Assessment of Prospects and Policy Issues, Kalba Bown Associates,
cited in Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 738 (the study found that the
projected effect of pay-DBS on local advertiser supported broadcasters was mini-
mal); National Cable Television Association, Inquiry into the Economic Relation-
ship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, cited in Proposed
Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 739 (the study found that cable systems engaged
in retransmission of over the air signals caused less than a 10% decline in local
audiences); Satellite Television Corp., Pay Television Services via Direct Broad-
cast Satellites: Demand and Impact in the 1980s, Arthur D. Little, Inc., cited in
Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 738 (the study found that the audience
diversion from local broadcasting to pay-DBS would be minimal).
6 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 689, 691. The FCC analogized the com-
petitive effect of DBS on local broadcasters to the effect of cable television which
has not justified FCC intervention. Id. at 689. See Malrite TV of New York v. FCC,
652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.denied, 102 S. Ct. 1002 (1982) (where the effect
of cable on local broadcasters was not so substantial as to justify Commission
intervention). See also supra note 63.
69 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 692. The basis of the local broadcasters'
argument was that loss of audience would result in the loss of advertising reve-
nues, causing broadcasters to reduce quality, locally-produced programming and
public service programs, all to the injury of the consumer. Id. at 686-87.
70 Id. at 683. The regulations were termed "interim" because of the desire of
the FCC to maintain flexible procedures and the pending RARC '83 discussion of
assignment of orbital slots. Id. at 683-84. For a discussion of RARC '83, see infra
notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
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"open entry," reflecting the deregulation philosophy evi-
dent in other areas of the communications industry.7 '
The FCC, considering the enormous capital investment
required and the unproven state of DBS technology, con-
cluded that encouragement of DBS entry into the market
warranted minimal technical and market restrictions.72
The approach of the Commission is to allow regulations
to develop in response to market forces. 73 DBS enter-
prises were, however, put on notice that the FCC reserved
the right to modify the regulations if adverse consumer
effects should occur as a result of the open entry policy.74
The Commission determined that rigid classification of
DBS systems would inhibit the burgeoning industry.75
Under the interim rules, DBS applicants were not re-
quired to conform to any particular existing model of a
broadcast entity, but could choose the regulatory scheme
under which their DBS system would be governed.76 DBS
systems could thus function as broadcasters, common car-
riers, or combination broadcasters/common carriers. 77
DBS may function as a broadcaster, like traditional local
radio and television stations, by controlling the program-
ming content of the signals it transmits for general public
reception. 78 Broadcasters are subject to special public in-
terest requirements in exchange for private control of the
industry. 79 Alternatively, DBS may function as a common
71 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
72 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 714. See also First Advisory Report, supra
note 3, at 4-8.
73 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 714.
74 Id. at 711.
75 Id. at 708. "The imposition of an a priori classfication would determine the
nature of the service at the outset and thus would largely foreclose the possibility
of gathering valuable experimental data." Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 709. "We see no reason.., why a DBS operator could not function as
broadcaster with respect to some channels and a common carrier with respect to
others." Id.
78 Id.
79 Nail. Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1199. Special public interest require-
ments impose restrictions on program content and mandate equitable access to
political candidates. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 73.1940 (1984) (broadcasts by candi-
dates for political office); 47 U.S.C. § 73.1930 (requiring political editorials).
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carrier by merely transmitting the signals of customers
who create or control the programming ("customer pro-
grammers").8 0 Common carriers are not subject to the
public interest requirements imposed on broadcasters,
but, in exchange, relinquish all control over the program-
ming.8 ' In addition, DBS may function as a combination
broadcaster/common carrier by transmitting signals car-
rying programming which it controls as well as transmit-
ting signals of customer programmers.8 2 The FCC
exempted all customer programmers from public interest
requirements even where the DBS itself was a common
carrier and not subject to the traditional broadcaster
restrictions.8 3
The Commission also refused to apply traditional
broadcast restrictions on ownership and control.8 4 Diver-
sification of ownership in other areas of broadcasting pur-
portedly satisfies First Amendment requirements for
diversity in programming and serves to prevent the pos-
session of excessive market power and ensuing antitrust
violations.8 5 The FCC concluded that monopoly power in
the video programming market by one DBS system would
be precluded by projected fierce competition and that im-
position of multiple channel ownership restrictions would
decrease chances for the financial success of DBS. 6
Following the same non-regulatory approach applied in
so Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 709. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-97 (1982)
(broadcaster regulations) (commonly referred to as Title III).
81 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 709. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 202-224 (1982)
(common carrier regulations) (commonly referred to as Title II).
802 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 709. See supra note 77.
83 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 711.
14 Id. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1984) (multiple channel and cross owner-
ship rules); Multiple Ownership Rules, 28 F.C.C.2d 662, 671 (1971); Multiple
Ownerships of Standard, FM and TV Broadcast Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, 319
(1970).
85 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 711. The FCC concluded that DBS will
increase the diversity of voices, thus satisfying First Amendment goals. Id. at 713.
06 See Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 712 (where the FCC stated that compe-
tition would prevent monopolistic pricing and abuses of market power). Implicit
in this assumption is that the relevant market, for antitrust analysis, would be
video programming rather than DBS systems.
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other areas of interim DBS rules, the Commission de-
clined to impose any technical standards other than those
imposed by international agreements.87 The application
process for DBS is likewise flexible. Applicants must de-
scribe the type of service to be provided, the technology
to be employed, and all other pertinent information.88
The application need not be presented in a specific format
and may even be presented in narrative form.8 9 There are
no specified financial requirements for the preliminary ap-
plication. 90 Upon approval of the application, the FCC
will grant a construction permit("CP"). 9 After obtaining
a CP, the DBS system must meet a "diligence" test.92 The
"diligence" test requires a showing of financial ability to
complete the project, commencement of construction or
execution of a contract for construction of a satellite
within one year of the grant of a CP, and operation of the
DBS satellite within six years of the grant of the CP.93
The FCC maintained strict control in only one area of
DBS regulation - frequency and orbit allocation.94 Since
frequencies and orbits are limited resources with indefina-
ble market values, the FCC concluded that market forces
would not yield optimal solutions.95 The decision of the
FCC rested on two overriding factors. First, international
agreements govern orbit and frequency allocations.9 6
Second, allocation requires policy judgments that depend
87 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 715. Subsequently, DBS firms have
formed a committee to develop voluntary technical standards for the DBS indus-
try. Justice Will Not Challenge DBS Standards Group, BROADCASTING, Oct. 22, 1984, at
50. The committee is forming technical standards to promote compatibility
among DBS systems as well as to promote market entry and consumer benefits. Id.
88 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 719.
89 Id.
9o Id
o Id. Before granting the CP, each application will be placed on public notice
for forty-five days, during which the public is invited to make comments. Id.
92 Id. The FCC requires the diligence test in lieu of stringent financial showings
before the CP is granted. Id.
83 Id.
Id. at 718.
85 Proposed Policy Statement, 86 F.C.C.2d at 749. See infra notes 113-141 and
accompanying text.
Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 718.
on public interest considerations. 97 Applicants may re-
quest frequencies and orbital positions and their prefer-
ences will be taken into account. 9 If requests conflict, the
FCC will consider all frequencies and orbits as equal and
will make an assignment on the basis of oral evidentiary
hearings. 99 Comparative hearings to resolve allocation
will not be available as long as unassigned frequencies
and orbits remain.'0 0
3. Judicial Review of the Interim Regulations
Following the adoption of the interim DBS regulations,
Satellite Television Corporation ("STC")' 0 ' made the
first application for a DBS construction permit. 10 2 The
Commission granted the STC contruction permit.10 3 The
National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") filed suit
against the FCC claiming the FCC exceeded its power by
implementing interim DBS regulations and granting the
DBS application of STC.10 4 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit generally approved the Com-
mission's interim regulations and entirely approved the
FCC's grant of the STC application.10 5 The court held
that the FCC exceeded its power only in granting DBS
customer programmers exemption from broadcast public
interest requirements. 0 6 The court further held that
transmissions from a DBS system fit the definition of
97 Id. at 719.
98 Id. at 718.
Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 719. Courts have generally held that the
Communications Act requires comparative hearings when the number of qualified
applicants exceeds the available spectrum space and there are genuine and sub-
stantial issues of fact. Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351 (1949).
-00 Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 719.
10, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 953 (1982). STC is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the Comsat Corporation, which is authorized by
COMSAT to engage in satellite communications services. Id. at 953 n.l.
1-0 Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1196.
10, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d at 954.
-04 Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1197. See also United States Satellite
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
1o- Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1195.
1-6 Id. at 1201.
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"broadcasting" even if special equipment is required for
reception. 0 7 According to the court, when a common
carrier DBS system leases its channels to a customer
programmer, one of the parties is a broadcaster and thus
subject to the public interest requirements. 0  The court
did not hold that all customer programmers were broad-
casters and suggested alternative methods of FCC regula-
tion consistent with statutory demands. 0 9 Furthermore,
the court made it clear that some uses of DBS will not
constitute broadcasting. 0 For example, where the pro-
gramming is of limited interest to a small class of sub-
scribers, the DBS program will not be considered a
"broadcast."'' The great majority of DBS applicants -
those seeking to provide direct-to-home service and re-
taining control over the programming - are broadcast-
ers under the interim regulations and remain unaffected
by the court's decision."12
B. Orbit and Frequency Allocation
The management and utilization of the limited fre-
quency spectrum and orbital resource is subject to the
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Includ-
ing the Moon and Outer Celestial Bodies" 3 ("Outer
107 Id. at 1204. The test for whether a particular activity is "broadcasting" is
"whether the programming is 'of interest to the general . . . audience' " (citing
Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 813 (1959) (emphasis in original). Id. at 1201. See infra note 186 and accom-
panying text.
'08 Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1201.
1o0 Id. at 1205. "For example, each satellite could be licensed on a common
carrier basis and the lessee of each channel, even if the satellite owner, licensed as
a broadcaster .... [11f a DBS owner leases time slots on a single channel rather
than the channel as a whole, it may make more sense to make the satellite owner
responsible for compliance with a broadcaster's statutory obligations." Id.
110 Id.
,, Id. (citing Functional Music, Inc., 274 F.C.C. 543 (affirming non-broadcast
treatment for transmission of background music to schools and retail
institutions)).
112 Nat' Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1205. See Report and Order, 90
F.C.C.2d 709, 710 n.82.
11 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
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Space Treaty") and the radio regulations of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union ("ITU").1 " The Outer
Space Treaty was drafted to ensure that exploration and
use of outer space are carried out in the interest of all
mankind, in the pursuit of peace, and without claims of
national sovereignty." 5 Therefore, the orbits and spec-
trums are res communis and may be utilized by states oper-
ating geostationary space objects as long as the state has
no intent to permanently appropriate the orbit or
spectrum. " 1
6
The primary responsibility for the regulation of orbital
and spectrum allocation and use rests with the ITU
through its World Administrative Radio Conferences
("WARC").1 7 Formal results of the WARCs take the form
of regulations which, when approved by the member na-
tions, have the force of international treaties."18 The ITU,
however, has no enforcement powers. 1 9 States, moti-
vated by an interest in orderly telecommunications sys-
tems, voluntarily participate in WARCs.' 20  The primary
function of the ITU is the technical coordination of world-
wide telecommunication by eliminating signal
interference. '2'
tion and Use of Outer Sapce, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
openedfor signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S.
205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty]. "States Parties to the Treaty shall
bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space.., whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities . I.." Id  art. VI. For a thorough discussion of the Outer Space Treaty, the
events leading up to it and amendments, see C. CHRISTOL, The United Nations and
the Regulation of the Space Environment (Outer Space, per se, the Moon, and other Celestial
Bodies): The 1967 Principles Treaty, in THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 12, 12-48 (1982).
114 International Telecommunications Convention, Final Acts of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union, latest revision Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495,
T.I.A.S. No. 8572 [hereinafter cited as ITU].
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 113, art. IV.
110 Christol, supra note 10, at 150-54.
117 Protecting Rights, supra note 32, at 212.
118 Id.
11 Id. at 213.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 214.
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In 1971, when the ITU made prior assignments of geo-
stationary orbits, only the United States and the Soviet
Union possessed the technological capability to launch a
communications satellite. 122  The ITU essentially made
assignments on a "first-come, first-served" basis, but ex-
pressed a clear intention that such assignments not be
construed as permanent property interests. 123  Since
1971, the WARCs have become a battleground for coun-
tries with divergent cultural and socio-political goals.'
24
Developing countries began to recognize the potential of
satellite technology to meet their needs for telecommuni-
cations systems.' 2 5  At the same time, the developing
countries feared that the geostationary orbital space
would be filled by the time they either purchased or devel-
oped the required technology.' 2 6 Though the ITU made
attempts to assure developing countries that the space re-
sources would be made available to them in the future as
their needs required, the attempts were largely unsuccess-
ful. 2 7 At WARC '79, the ITU adopted a resolution to
reappraise the largely ad hoc mechanisms for awarding or-
bit and spectrum positions. 128
Region 2 countries of the ITU, those in the Western
12 Levy, supra note 29, at 172.
123 C. CHRISTOL, The International Legal Regime for the Exploration of the Or-
bit/Spectrum Resource: The ITU and the UN, in THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 547, 558 (1982) [hereinafter cited as C. Christol, Int'l Legal Regime].
124 First Advisory Report, supra note 5, at 4-3.
125 Id. at 2-11 - 2-12.
12 Id. See Space WARC Primed to Make History, BROADCASTING, May 13, 1985, at
82.
The number of satellites the geostationary orbit can accommodate is
limited by its physical boundaries and by the potential for signal in-
terference between satellites. Similarly, the number of operatiors a
radio frequency band can accommodate is finite and limited by the
width of the band and the potential for interference between
operators.
Up In the Air, supra note 63, at 131.
127 C. CHRISTOL, Int'l Legal Regime, supra note 123, at 568.
128 Resolution No. 3, Relating to the Use of Geostationary Satellite Orbit and
the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It, Radio Regulations, arts. 11, 13 at
RES3-1. The purpose was: "To guarantee in practice for all countries equitable
access to the geostationary orbit and the frequency bands allocated to the space
service using it." Id.
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Hemisphere, held a Regional Administrative Radio Con-
ference ("RARC") in 1983.129 The RARC '83 adopted a
direct broadcast satellite plan providing for adequate allo-
cation of the orbit/spectrum. 30 A major accomplishment
was the adoption of flexible regulatory procedures which
provide for implementation of systems during the devel-
opmental stages without total compliance with the techni-
cal aspects of the plan.1 3 ' The RARC '83 decisions were
not integrated into the radio regulations until WARC
'85. 132
The ITU held Space WARC '85 for five weeks during
August and September 1985 in Geneva.1 3 3 Extended de-
bates resulted in a forced consensus regarding the or-
bit/spectrum allotment plan, but the conference defeated
a strict a priori plan advocated by a large number of devel-
oping countries.' 34 Under the compromise plan, each
country will be alloted at least one orbital position within
a certain frequency band.13 5 A WARC committee will as-
sign orbital positions in other bands set aside for expan-
sion using a multilateral planning method.136  A
multilateral planning method is a procedure whereby new
satellite systems will be considered in batches rather than
on a case-by-case basis as in the current procedure.1
3 7
The new method calls for the sharing of technical adjust-
ments required to accommodate a new system; under the
prior system the burden was carried by the newcomer
alone.13 8 The incorporation of the direct broadcast satel-
- Federal Communications Commission, Second Advisory Committee Report,
ITU WARC ORB '85, at 18 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Second Advisory
Report].
]so Id.
13, See DuCharme, supra note 41, at 278.
132 Space WARC Reaches Consensus, BROADCASTING, Sept. 16, 1985, at 40.
133 Id.
,-' WARC 1985: The Politics of Space, BROADCASTING, Sept. 23, 1985, at 56-57.
's5 Id. at 57. "The arc allotment plan is to be established in the 4500-4800 mhz
band and in 300 mhz of the 6425-7025 mhz band, as well as in 500 mhz of the
10.70-13.25 mhz band." Id.
156 Id.
137 Second Advisory Report, supra note 129, at 27.
138 Curtain Going Up on Space WARC, BROADCASTING, Aug. 5, 1985, at 75.
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lite plan of RARC '83 into the international radio regula-
tions finalized the orbit/spectrum assignment plan for the
Western Hemisphere countries. 13 9 At the close of the
conference, some countries expressed reservations about
the total orbit/spectrum plans. 140 ITU will treat reserva-
tions expressed after the Final Acts are incorporated in
1988 as notification that a country does not consider itself
bound by the decision with which it disagrees.' 4'
C. Overspill and Prior Consent
Central to the desire for equitable access to the geosta-
tionary orbit/spectrum is an awareness and appreciation
of the power to communicate words and ideas. DBS has
the power to transmit informational signals across na-
tional borders. 142 Apart from the obvious advantages of
this capability, some nations believe that DBS poses a
threat to their national security, the integrity of their na-
tion's culture, and the fulfillment of their national
goals. 143 Thus, countries have sought limitations on DBS
in order to prevent signal overspill, control program con-
tent, and require prior consent before a DBS system
transmits signals for reception within a receiving coun-
try's borders. 144 Since 1959, the United Nations ("UN")
has wrestled with the drafting of a set of principles re-
garding these DBS concerns. 145
The most recent resolution adopted by the UN is Prin-
ciples Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth
Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting
("General Assembly Resolution 37/92").46 Countries
not possessing DBS capabilites were concerned that in the
139 Space WARC Reaches Consensus, supra note 132, at 42.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
143 A. CHAYES & P. LASKIN, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES: POLICIES
AND PROBLEMS 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CHAYES & LASKIN].
144 Id.
145 Christol, supra note 10, at 142.
146 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Inter-
national Direct Television Broadcasting, GA. Res. 92, 37 U.N. GAOR (100th plen.
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near future DBS systems would become commercialized
and interfere with domestic matters. 147 General Assembly
Resolution 37/92 addresses unavoidable overspill, prior
consent, and, indirectly, control of program content.
48
The desire to control content extends beyond restriction
of direct propaganda to restriction of news, music, and
cultural programs which originate outside a country's
borders. 149
The United States opposed General Assembly Resolu-
tion 37/92 on the basis that the requirement of prior con-
sent or agreement would violate international law,
particularly the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.' Furthermore, the United States takes the posi-
tion that it has a sovereign right to transmit international
broadcasts and that restrictions on program content of
American broadcasts would violate the First Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. 15 1
Thus far, the ITU has resisted efforts of the Soviet
Union and lesser developed countries to expand ITU's in-
volvement into issues of satellite overspill and prior con-
sent. 52  However, the United States, particularly under
mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/92 (1983) [hereinafter cited as General Resolu-
tion 37/92].
147 Christol, supra note 10, at 149.
148 Id. at 145. The pertinent provisions of General Assembly Resolution 37/92
are:
G. Duty and Right to Consult
10. Any broadcasting or receiving State within an international di-
rect television broadcasting satellite service established between
them [when requested]... should promptly enter into consultations
with the requesting State regarding its activities in the field of inter-
national [DBS] .
J. Consultations ... Between States
13. A State which intends to establish . . . [a DBS] service shall
without delay notify the proposed receiving State ... of such inten-
tion.... With respect to. . . the radiations of the satellite signal, the
relevant instruments of the [ITU] shall be exclusively applicable.
General Resolution 37/92, supra note 146.
149 CHAYEs & LASKIN, supra note 143, at 8.
5o Christol, supra note 10, at 145-46. See Art. 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
15, Christol, supra note 10, at 155; C. CHRISTOL, DTB supra note 29, at 708.
152 Protecting Rights, supra note 32, at 708.
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the Reagan administration, has been concerned over the
increasing politicization of the ITU. l5 1 The threat of with-
drawal of the United States from the ITU may encourage
the ITU to limit its involvement to the technical operation
of radio services rather than the deciding of legal or polit-
ical issues. 154
D. Signal Piracy and Copyright
Satellite technology has not progressed to the point
where a satellite's "footprint" may be limited to the area it
is intended to reach. As a consequence, signal spillover
occurs. 155 The use of DBS will increase the amount of sig-
nal spillover and create the greatest potential for unau-
thorized reception or "signal piracy." 156 Under
traditional broadcast contracts, the broadcaster pays roy-
alties to the copyright owner on the basis of the intended
broadcast area. 57  DBS systems cannot contractually
guarantee an intended area of reception because millions
of viewers outside the intended area can receive the trans-
missions. 158 Signal piracy produces two causes of concern
for DBS systems: a potential loss in subscription fees to
the DBS operator and loss of copyright earnings to the
contributing artists and broadcast companies. 159 Execu-
tives of leading American communications businesses
identified copyright infringement as the most serious
15, Curtain Going Up on Space WARC, supra note 138, at 75.
1- Protecting Rights, supra note 32, at 213.
155 Signal spillover from the United States satellites is currently confined to the
Caribbean Basin countries and Canada. Note, Signal Piracy: The Theft of United States
Satellite Signals, 8 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 62, 64 n.7 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Signal
Piracy].
156 Protecting Rights, supra note 32, at 209.
157 Id. at 210.
158 Id.
,5 The United States Copyright Office estimates that United States copyright
holders are losing $1.5 billion in foreign earnings each year through unauthorized
use of copyrighted works. Copyright Office Seeks to Stem Foreign Losses, BROADCASTING,
Oct. 8, 1984, 81. The United States International Trade Commission estimates
that each year the United States loses $6-8 billion in domestic and foreign earn-
ings due to copyright and patent infringement and counterfeiting. Copyright In-
fringement Tops List of International Problems, BROADCASTING, Oct. 8, 1984, at 82
[hereinafter cited as Copy Infringement].
problem in international trade. 160 The domestic home
satellite receiver market has been expanding at a rapid
rate; estimates indicate that approximately 600,000 dishes
are in place and are increasing at a rate of 30,000 to
60,000 a month.1 6 Since DBS can be received on a small
dish, the number of dishes in congested urban areas will
increase. 162 Members of the home satellite receiver indus-
try expressed a belief that charges of illegality of unau-
thorized reception of satellite signals discouraged some
potential buyers. 163 Thus, the potential for signal priacy
continues to increase domestically and internationally.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984164 legal-
izes the reception of unscrambled satellite television sig-
nals by home viewers for personal use. The act provides
criminal and civil penalties for the unauthorized reception
of scrambled signals and creates a procedure whereby
programmers may obtain compensation for their work by
entering into agreements with manufacturers and dealers
of home satellite receiver dishes. 165  The satellite
programmer thus has the option of either scrambling its
signal or negotiating compensation through a product
marketing scheme. 66
Four major multilateral treaties address copyright law:
the Universal Copyright Convention, 67 the Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
1- Copyright Infringement, supra note 159, at 82.
16, Home is Where the Dish Is, BROADCASTING, Sept. 10, 1984, at 92.
162 Id. at 93.
163 Id.
-6 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1986). The new copyright policy is intended as an
amendment to Section 605 of the 1934 Communications Act, supra note 47; Sec-
tion 605 prohibits the unauthorized publishing or interception of any communica-
tion by wire or radio to the public. Id.
36s Backyard Dish Industry Gets Boost from Cable Bill, BROADCASTING, Oct. 22, 1984
at 84, 85. The compensation agreements, for example, could take the form of a
roylaty on the hardware sold by the manufacturer or dealer. Id.
166 Id.
367 The Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S.
No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132 revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No.
7868.
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(the "Berne Convention"), 68 the Rome Convention for
the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations (the "Rome Conven-
tion"), 69 and the Convention Relating to the Distribution
of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite
(the "Brussels Satellite Convention"). 7 0  The United
States belongs to the Universal Copyright Convention,
but to neither the Berne Convention, the Rome Conven-
tion, nor the Brussels Satellite Convention.17 ' All of the
above mentioned treaties fall short of adequately address-
ing the unauthorized interception of program carrying
DBS signals.
The Universal Copyright Convention was drafted in
simple form in order to include as many members as pos-
sible while not requiring major amendments to the do-
mestic law of the member states.17 2  Article IV of the
Universal Copyright Convention grants contributing art-
ists the exclusive right to authorize reproduction of their
works by any means.' 73 The Convention requires states to
protect the copyright owners' rights but includes no de-
tails as to the methods of protection. 74 Enforcement is
further hindered by the requirement of a contract be-
-i Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened
for signature Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24, 1971, 331 U.N.T.S. 218 [hereinafter cited
as the Berne Convention].
69 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter cited as the Rome Convention.].
170 Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme Carrying Signals
Transmitted by Satellite, opened for signature, May 21, 1974, Art. 1, 13 I.L.M. 1444,
1447 [hereinafter cited as the Brussels Satellite Convention].
171 Signal Piracy, supra note 155, at 67 n.15.
172 Id. at 73. See Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 167, at Preamble.
',- Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 167, art. IV bis.
174 Art. 1 provides that "[ejach Contracting State undertakes to provide for the
adequate and effective protection of the rights of authors and other copyright
proprietors .. " Id. at art. I. Art. X provides that "[e]ach Contracting State
undertakes to adopt... such measures as are necessary to ensure the application
of this Convention." Id. at art. X. Art. XV provides that a dispute between two
Contracting States, not settled by negotiation, shall be brought before the Inter-
national Court ofJustice for determination. Id. at art. XV. See Signal Priacy, supra
note 155, at 74.
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tween the creator and the broadcaster. 175  Most impor-
tantly, the definition of the term "broadcasting" makes it
unclear whether the Universal Copyright Convention ap-
plies to satellite transmissions. 176
The Berne Convention possesses a similarly vague defi-
nition of broadcasting. 17 7 The Convention provides pro-
tection only to authors of "literary and artistic works,"
thus failing to recognize the interests of performers, rec-
ord producers, and broadcast organizations. 78  The
United States has not ratified the Berne Convention be-
cause adherence would conflict with existing domestic
copyright regulations. 179
The Rome Convention addresses the rights of perform-
ers, record producers and broadcasters rather than the
copyright owner of the original work.' 0 The protections
granted by the Convention are subject to exceptions and
reservations made by the Contracting States.' 8 ' The
Rome Convention makes no mention of technical aspects
of broadcasting or satellite transmissions. 8 2 Furthermore,
only countries which are members of the Berne Conven-
tion or the Universal Copyright Convention may become
175 See Protecting Rights, supra note 32, at 218.
176 Id. at 217. The traditional definition of broadcasting applies to transmis-
sions which can be received directly by the public. The broader view, which
would include DBS, is that broadcasting includes signals intended for direct re-
ception by the public. Id. at 217 n.76. Compare infra note 186 and accompanying
text with Nat ' Ass'n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1204 (where the court held that
DBS transmissions constitutued broadcasting even if special equipment was re-
quired for reception). See generally supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
177 Protecting Rights, supra note 32, at 219.
178 Id.
I'l Signal Piracy, supra note 155, at 72. The areas of conflict in the Berne Con-
vention include "automatic recognition of copyright without any formalities ...
and the retroactivity of copyright protection with respect to works which are al-
ready in the public domain of the United States." Id. at 72 n.49.
,o Id. at 74. See Rome Convention, supra note 169, arts. 7, 10, 13.
18, See Rome Convention, supra note 169, art. 16. The protection afforded by
the Rome Convention varies from state to state depending upon the domestic
legislation and reservations to the treaty. Signal Piracy, supra note 155, at 75.
182 Signal Piracy, supra note 155, at 75 n.75. See Rome Convention, supra note
169, art. 3.
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members of the Rome Convention. 3  The Rome Con-
vention thus affords inconsistent protection in few coun-
tries capable of receiving the DBS signals. 18 4
The Brussels Satellite Convention was drafted specifi-
cally to address the copyright problems of satellite trans-
missions and holds the most promise for providing
copyright protection to DBS transmissions. 185  Similar to
the other treaties discussed above, the definition of
broadcasting makes it debatable whether or not DBS
transmissions are excluded from copyright regulation. 86
The central issue of the Convention was whether to grant
rights to the broadcasting organizations or to the pro-
gram contributors.' 87 The Convention compromised by
requiring the member states to develop "adequate meas-
ures to prevent the distribution on or from its territory of
any programme-carrying signal by any distributor for
whom the signal emitted to or passing through the satel-
lite is not intended."' 88 The vagueness of the Convention
allows member states to decide which copyright protec-
tion to offer, but makes it unclear whether the copyright
owner has standing to bring a proceeding against an un-
authorized user in his own behalf. 189 The Convention has
183 Protecting Rights, supra note 32, at 221. See Rome Convention, supra note 169,
art. 23.
184 Forty countries adhere to the Rome Convention. Signal Piracy, supra note
155, at 74 n.70. Disputes between two member states are to be referred to the
International Court of Justice. Rome Convention, supra note 169, art. 30.
185 Signal Piracy, supra note 155, at 75-76.
186 Id at 77 n.96. Article 3 states: "This Convention shall not apply where the
signals emitted by or on behalf of the originating organization are intended for
direct receptionfrom the satellite by the general public." Brussels Satellite Convention,
supra note 170, art. 3 (emphasis added). DBS transmissions are intended for di-
rect reception from the satellite. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The
DBS signals could be covered by the convention if the special receiver equipment
prevents the signal from being received by the "general public." See Signal Piracy,
supra note 155, at 69. Delegates to the Convention proposed a change in the
wording of Art. 3 to make it clear that the exclusion of DBS is not so broad as to
exclude distributors who "pirate" program-carrying signals from conventional
satellites and transmit the stolen signals from a DBS service. See Brussels Satellite
Convention, supra note 170, at 1461.
187 Protecting Rights, supra note 32, at 222.
188 Brussels Satellite Convention, supra note 170, art. 2.
189 Protecting Rights, supra note 32, at 222.
not entered into force because only four states have rati-
fied it.' 90 The United States Copyright Office has sug-
gested prompt ratification of the Brussels Satellite
Convention in order to internationally recognize the ille-
gality of signal piracy.' 9 '
E. Liability and Damage Claims
The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects allows damage claims for viola-
tions of the Outer Space Treaty obligations. 92 The state
is the only party empowered to pursue damage claims
against another state. 193 Thus an individual claimant, cor-
poration, or business enterprise must pursue damage
claims in alternative forums.' 94 The state that authorizes
the launch of a space object remains liable for damages
caused by the object to aircraft in flight or to anything on
the Earth's surface. 195  Liability for damages to other
space objects is based on a finding of fault. 196
The Convention on the Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space' 97 imposes a duty on states to
register objects that they launch into space. One purpose
of the registration of space objects is to assist with identi-
-90 The Brussels Satellite Convention requires ratification by five states before it
can become effective. Brussels Satellite Convention, supra note 170, art. 10.
19, Copyright Office, supra note 159, at 81.
192 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2459(b) (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Liability Convention].
-" Id., arts. IX, XI.
194 Id. Alternative forums are available. For example, United States citizens and
injured foreign parties can sue the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 - 2680 (1982).
I'm Liability Convention, supra note 192, art. II. The United States minimizes its
liability by requiring private space enterprises to obtain adequate liability insur-
ance. The amount of insurance is determined by the Secretary of the Dept. of
Transportation after consulting with the Attorney General and other appropriate
agencies. See Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 3055 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 2601 - 2623).
196 Liability Convention supra note 192, art. III.
197 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 [hereinafter
cited as Registration Convention].
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fication of objects involved in damage claims.19 8  Each
launching state is responsible for establishing and main-
taining a registration system.' 99
III. THE OUTLOOK FOR DBS
Although adoption of the FCC's interim rules for DBS
caused an early flurry of application activity, few appli-
cants are still working towards a launch in the near fu-
ture.2 °0 Some reports indicate that the lack of definite
orbital/spectrum assignments has been a major obstacle
in obtaining financial backing for DBS.2° 1 Since the
RARC '83 plan has been approved by the ITU and a strict
a priori planning approach was defeated at Space WARC
'85, the orbit/spectrum issue should no longer be an
obstacle.
The FCC adopted a minimal set of interim regulations
designed to encourage "open entry" into the DBS mar-
ket.2 0 2 Until the interim regulations were approved by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the
regulations provided a precarious foundation on which to
build such an expensive venture.2 °3 After affirmance by
the court, more confidence in the longevity of the rulings
appears to be justified. However, the court's decision to
overrule the FCC's conclusion that customer program-
mers of common carrier DBS systems could be exempted
from traditional broadcast obligations shows just how "in-
1'8 C. CHRISTOL, The 1975 Registration Convention, in THE MODERN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 213, 239 (1982).
1- Registration Convention, supra note 197, art. II.
2- Thinning Ranks of DBS Pioneers Heads for July 17, BROADCASTING, July 16, 1984,
at 30. After the application of STC was approved, thirteen other applicants fol-
lowed in the first round. Id. Eight applicants were granted construction permits.
Id. Seven applicants met theJanuary 12, 1984 deadline for the second round. Id.
Only four first round applicants met the diligence test and were still in the run-
ning. DBS Ranks Cut in Half, BROADCASTING, Oct. 15, 1984, at 75.
201 See Space WARC Primed to Make History, supra note 126, at 90; Implications of
DBS, supra note 12, at 25. STC had to withdraw from its DBS venture because of
lack of financing and will reportedly take a $24 million pre-tax write off.
202 See supra notes 47-112 and accompanying text.
20- See supra notes 101-112 and accompanying text.
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terim" the DBS regulations may be. °4 Furthermore, the
court has already warned DBS operators not to consider
multiple-channel ownership an irrevocable property
right.20 5 The FCC has expressed a reluctance to change
the rules once a service is operating, but it appears the
court will not let financial investments interfere with their
decisions should the FCC exceed its authority. 20 6
The FCC correctly predicted fierce competition for
DBS in the video/programming market. Local broadcast-
ers and national television networks are performing
well.20 7 Plans exist for laying high quality fiber optic links
under the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans .2 0  The fiber optics
could reduce most of the increased demand for interna-
tional communication in the areas serviced by the optic
links.20 9 Cable operators and pay-per-view companies are
becoming more aggressive.2 10  Home Box Office
("HBO"), a subscription television programmer, plans to
increase its market share and pre-empt the high-powered
DBS by courting customers with home satellite receiver
dishes in addition to its current cable customers.2 11 Less
expensive, low power satellites are currently being devel-
oped into direct-to-home transmitters, requiring only
slightly larger receivers than those needed for DBS recep-
tion. 12 The competitors hope to capture the potential
DBS customers before DBS gets the opportunity to begin
2 o See National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
205 Id. at 1208-09.
206 See id.
207 Note, DBS, The FCC, and the Prospects for Diversity and CQnsumer Sovereignty in
Broadcasting, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 551, 557 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Consumer
Sovereignty].
208 Satellite Predictions Drop, BROADCASTING July 29, 1985, at 49.
209 Id.
210 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
21, Home is Where the Dish Is, supra note 161, at 93.
212 The low power satellites that are being used as direct to home transmitters
are referred to as Ku-band and C-band Satellites. See id. at 92-93; The Search for
Ubiquity in Television, BROADCASTING, July 8, 1985, at 52 (stating that the establish-
ment of Ku-band services will further impede DBS services' search for financial
backing).
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transmitting.21 3 The low power direct transmitting satel-
lites may also divert some investors who would otherwise
be attracted to DBS.21 4 Critics of DBS claim that satellite
entertainment broadcasting will only be successful as an
adjunct to cable.21 5 Cable operators already possess the
equipment, the customers, and the people to handle the
broadcast satellite business.21 6
The FCC imposed no technical requirements on DBS
systems, and technical requirements imposed by the ITU
are merely intended to reduce signal interference. 7
Non-regulation was intended to encourage experimenta-
tion with state of the art technology. 2 18 In response to the
lack of regulations, DBS applicants have formed a trade
association to establish private uniform technical stan-
dards. 219 The DPS applicants hope to improve their
chances for success in the market by promulgating techni-
cal standards to promote compatibility among DBS re-
ceiving equipment. 2 °
Technical difficulties with power sources have plagued
DBS satellites. The Japanese Broadcasting Corporation
launched the first high-power DBS in January 1984.22
Shortly after launch of the DBS, two of its three transmis-
sion tubes failed.222 As a result, the Japanese DBS is
broadcasting on only one channel instead of the two it an-
ticipated.223 The transmission power also has a direct in-
fluence on the quality of the picture received by the
213 The Search for Ubiquity in Television, supra note 212, at 52.
214 Id
215 USCI Stays Afloat with Cash from TCI, BROADCASTING, Apr. 1 1985, 89.
216 Id.
217 See supra notes 47-127 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
213 Justice Will Not Challenge DBS Standards Group, BROADCASTING, Oct. 22, 1984,
at 50 [hereinafter cited as Justice].
220 Id.
221 HDTV DBS Standards, supra note 15, at 42.
222 Id Sophisticated power sources fuel the transmission tubes. Id. Feasibility
studies of a DBS system for the Voice of America will explore solar and nuclear
power as potential DBS power sources. USIA Funds VOA Study of DBS, BROADCAST-
ING, Sep. 3, 1984, at 40.
223 Id.
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viewer. For example, a simulator test of STC's proposed
240 watt broadcasts, to be received on a one meter diame-
ter dish, yielded pictures that were unacceptably noisy.22 4
The dish antennae are also a major problem with satel-
lite broadcasting. 225  The dishes must be carefully
mounted, strong winds may cause the dish to lose sight of
the satellite, and many people find the dishes pose an aes-
thetic problem.226 Various companies are researching al-
ternative antenna designs that are less vulnerable and
obtrusive.2 27
No firm, enforceable regulations exist to protect DBS
transmissions from signal pirates and unauthorized use of
copyrighted works.228 In fact, the Cable Communications
Act allows the unauthorized reception of unscrambled
signals.2 9 Scrambling signals increases the cost of the
DBS system.2 30 Failure to scramble the signal will result in
loss of subscriber fees. However, if the DBS system is
supported by advertising dollars as well as subscriber
fees, the increase in audience size may inflate advertiser
revenues enough to offset the lost subscription fees.2 3'
Properly launching satellites into geostationary orbits
may be a real cause of concern to DBS operators. Last
year, three satellites with a total insured value of $282
million misfired, rendering them useless and lost in
space.23 2 Insurance costs for satellites have consequently




227 Id. at 42-43. The alternatives include flat rectangular antennas and a varia-
tion of the phased-array planar antennas used on aircraft for radar. Id.
228 See supra notes 155-191 and accompanying text.
229 For a discussion of the Cable Communications Act, see supra notes 164-166
and accompanying text.
230 See The Search for Ubiquity in Television, supra note 212.
2-1 Home descrambler units will sell for around $300. Home is Where the Dish Is,
supra note 161, at 93. Advertisers are currently taking advantage of the pan-Euro-
pean broadcasting of Sky, Rupert Murdoch's general entertainment channel. Ad
revenue for 1985 is expected to be between one and two million pounds. European
Satellite TV Launches Ads in Global Orbit, ADWEEK, Dec. 23, 1985.
222 Implications of DBS, supra note 12, at 9.
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constitute as much as twenty per cent of the cost of con-
structing and launching a satellite.2 3 3 High premiums are
not the sole problem associated with satellite insurance; it
is difficult to locate a carrier who is willing to insure the
risk.234 In addition to insurance on the satellite itself, the
DBS operator must purchase adequate liability insurance
to meet statutory requirements.2 35
Financial and technical problems have prevented DBS
system from becoming operational. The lack of technical
specifications in the interim regulations has required fur-
ther research and additional funding. Uncertainty over
orbit allocations has discouraged investment. Further-
more, while the DBS applicants struggle with the interim
DBS regulations, the competition from other broadcast
media has been growing fierce.
IV. CONCLUSION
Early critics of the interim FCC rules expressed a belief
that the FCC acted hastily when it determined that DBS
was in the best interest of the public and when it formu-
lated the "open entry" policy. 236 No concrete evidence
existed then, or now, that DBS will provide diversity in
programming and consumer sovereignty in the United
States.237 DBS technology possesses the capability to
broadcast to remote areas currently unserved by other
communications systems, but it does not necessarily fol-
low that private profit-seeking DBS enterprises will be
motivated to serve those areas unless it is incidental to
their transmissions to more populated, profitable areas.
Neither does it follow that total deregulation of an in-
dustry will result in consumer and economic benefit. 38
Regulatory restrictions provide burdens and benefits.
233 Id. at 10.
234 Id.
235 See supra notes 192-199 and accompanying text.
236 Up in the Air, supra note 63, at 144-47.
237 Id. at 136-39.
2 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
The FCC structured the DBS rules to minimize the bur-
dens on the developing industry.2 39 However, in refusing
to regulate, the FCC denied the DBS systems the benefits
of regulatory protection. The enormous amount of capital
required to develop a DBS system mandates regulations
offering some security along with the freedom. The de-
sire for security is evidenced by the DBS trade associa-
tion's establishment of uniform technical standards. 40
Under the FCC perspective these uniform standards may
be viewed as private regulations developing in response
to market forces. 4' One may question if such trade asso-
ciation self regulation is really in the best interests of com-
petition and consumers. Trade association self-regulation
is usually viewed as anti-competitive behavior in antitrust
analysis.242 For the DBS operator there is no assurance
that the regulatory framework will not be altered should
DBS become very successful and acquire significant mar-
ket power.
One commentator said that DBS is a technology in
search of a market.243 This indeed seems to be true. The
American enterprises, as opposed to private industry in
other countries and foreign governmental organizations,
possess the greatest potential for developing a function-
ing DBS system. American businesses have the advantage
of experimentation in a free market as well as access to
state of the art technology and potential investors who
hope to make a large return. The one element missing is
a consumer market. The competition in the domestic en-
tertainment/communications market is great. Consumers
239 Id.
240 See supra notes 87, 219-220 and accompanying text.
241 See 90 F.C.C.2d at 714.
242 The potential anticompetitive results of trade association self-regulation in-
clude the erection of significant entry barriers to potential market participants,
discouragement of innovative development, price fixing and the dissemination of
information. Justice, supra note 226, at 50. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). "The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition,
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id. at 238.
24- Satellite Progress, supra note 13, at 39.
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already have a wide choice of programming sources from
which to choose. Breaking familiar habits of consumers is
difficult, as evidenced by the tenacity of local radio and
television programming in the face of syndications, net-
work and cable television as well as other forms of video
entertainment. American consumers, particularly the
technologically aware potential DBS customers, are infor-
mation and entertainment rich. Thus, the unique
capabilites of DBS would not be fully utilized and DBS
would be neither a financial nor informational success.
The undeveloped countries currently without commu-
nications systems are the best prospects for DBS services.
These countries need the capabilities DBS can offer.
Without competing systems, the initial investments are
not quite so risky. Furthermore, the goal of sharing ideas
and information can be met in a meaningful way. If the
development of DBS depends solely on its prospects for
economic success, the potential of DBS may never be
fulfilled.
DBS technology deserves to be developed and utilized.
The current technological problems of DBS, such as
power sources and picture quality, the inability of private
DBS applicants to secure financing in the face of insecure
regulation, and an unproven consumer market indicate
that DBS development must proceed under a model other
than private enterprise. Many smaller countries with gov-
ernment-owned communication systems have already
combined resources to promote DBS development.2 44
The benefits of DBS are not national but international.
The FCC concluded that development of DBS systems
was in the best interest of the American public, thus, the
United States government has an obligation to assist in
the development of this technology. A quasi-public cor-
poration may be the best vehicle to meet this obligation.
A quasi-public corporation would be financed by both the
244 Id. at 39-40. An emerging pan-European project is one commissioned by the
European Space Agency known as L-Sat. Id. at 40.
government and the private sector.245 Congress would
have a role in the management of the corporation.24 6 The
advantage to this model is the ability of Congress to bal-
ance such divergent interests as treaty obligations and na-
tional goals. 247 A quasi-public corporation model would
also assist in maintaining free services to the public and
assuring broadcast services to residents of remote areas.
Once the DBS service is launched and competing in the
broadcast marketplace, control can be completely trans-
ferred to the private sector. The current domestic regula-
tory framework has not assisted DBS enterprises or
consumers and has not furthered the goal of the world-
wide sharing of information and communication. It is
time for the FCC to reconsider the "open entry" DBS pol-
icy because DBS has not entered the skies.
24- For a thorough discussion of different corporation models for doing busi-
ness in space, see Who's the Captain Kirk?, supra note 64, at 795.
241 Id. at 815.
247 Id. at 816.
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